Environment-dependent payoffs in finite populations by Xu, Weihong et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
31
2.
38
61
v1
  [
q-
bio
.PE
]  
12
 D
ec
 20
13
Environment-dependent payoffs in finite populations
Weihong Xua, Yanling Zhanga, Guangming Xiea
a Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing
100871, China
Abstract
In constant-payoff finite population games, when selection is weak and population size is large, the one-third law
serves as the condition for a strategy to be advantageous. We generalize the result to the case where payoff matrices
are environment-dependent and provide a more general law. In this way we model feedback from the environment
and show its impact on the dynamics.
1. Introduction
In the 1970s, J. Maynard Smith and G.R.Price brought the concept of game into biology, and introduced the idea
of evolutionary game theory to describe population dynamics (Smith et al., 1982; Smith and Price, 1973). Since then,
the idea has been widely used in biology, economy and society, where how cooperation emerges among egoistic
individuals is a major concern.
Nowak et al. (2004) introduced the fixation probability of a single A-individual (usually we consider a cooperator),
denoted by ρA, which is defined as the probability that its offspring lineage invades and takes over a population of
(N − 1) many B-individuals. If the fixation probability is bigger than that of a neutral mutant, 1/N, strategy A is
deemed advantageous. Under weak selection, computation has shown that ρA > 1/N for large N if
a + 2b > c + 2d, (1)
where a, b, c and d are the payoffs of A versus A, A versus B, B versus A and B versus B, or denoted with a payoff
matrix
A B
A
B
(
a
b
c
d
) (2)
This condition is equivalent of requiring the fitness of an A-player to be higher than that of a B-player when the
frequency of A is 1/3, and was dubbed the one-third law. Ohtsuki et al. (2007) provided an intuition of the law.
In most game-theoretical studies, the payoff matrices are constant, but some recent studies have been trying
to model feedback from the environment by varying the entries of the payoff matrices to the state of the system
(Tomochi and Kono, 2002; Lee et al., 2011).
In our paper, we treat finite population games with environment-dependent payoffs as a generalization of the
traditional model. In the general case, we provide the condition for a strategy to be advantageous, of which the one-
third law is a specialization. We then apply our findings to the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift game (also called
hawk-dove game or chicken game), and cases in between, to show what effect feedback from the environment brings
to the evolution.
2. Model and the condition for a strategy to be advantageous
We discuss the situation where the payoff matrix
A B
A
B
(
a( j)
b( j)
c( j)
d( j)
) (3)
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varies with the number of A-players j, representing feedback from the environment. For simplicity, a( j), b( j), c( j)
and d( j) are assumed linear functions of j, i.e., a( j) = a0 + a1 j, b( j) = b0 + b1 j, c( j) = c0 + c1 j, and d( j) = d0 + d1 j.
The model studied by Nowak et al. and Ohtsuki et al., where a1 = b1 = c1 = d1 = 0 (Nowak et al., 2004;
Ohtsuki et al., 2007), can be considered a special case. In Ohtsuki et al. (2007), it was shown that in the limit of large
N, one-third of the opponents that one meets (in interactions leading to state changes) until either extinction or fixation
are A-players and two-thirds are B-players, and condition (1) is the exactly the same as the condition that the average
payoff of A-players along an invasion-path is higher than that of B-players. In our generalized situation, though one
still meets B-players twice as often as A-players, the average payoffs along an invasion-path cannot be calculated as
easily. Instead, we should take into consideration that a, b, c and d vary with j. From
1
N − 1
N−1∑
j=1
σ¯1 j
( (A → A)| ja( j) (A → B)| jb( j)
(B → A)| jc( j) (B → B)| jd( j)
)
=
1
N − 1
N−1∑
j=1
2(N − j)
N
( ( j − 1)(a0 + a1 j) (N − j)(b0 + b1 j)
j(c0 + c1 j) (N − j − 1)(d0 + d1 j)
)
,
(4)
where σ¯1 j is the relative frequency that state j is visited (Ohtsuki et al., 2007), the average payoff of A-players along
an invasion-path is
1
N − 1
N−1∑
j=1
2(N − j)
N(N − 1) [( j − 1)(a0 + a1 j) + (N − j)(b0 + b1 j)]
=
1
6(N − 1) [(a1 + b1︸  ︷︷  ︸
A2
)N2 + (2a0 − a1 + 4b0 + b1︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
A1
)N + (−4a0 − 2a1 − 2b0︸                ︷︷                ︸
A0
)],
(5)
and that of B-players is
1
N − 1
N−1∑
j=1
2(N − j)
N(N − 1) [ j(c0 + c1 j) + (N − j − 1)(d0 + d1 j)]
=
1
6(N − 1) [(c1 + d1︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2
)N2 + (2c0 + c1 + 4d0 − d1︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
B1
)N + (2c0 − 8d0 − 2d1︸             ︷︷             ︸
B0
)].
(6)
Therefore, for large N, the condition for strategy A to be advantageous is
A2 > B2, (7)
or A2 = B2A1 > B1 , (8)
or 
A2 = B2
A1 = B1
A0 > B0
. (9)
Here a1, b1, c1 and d1 are the main factors because N is so large that on the path of invasion, for a significant amount
of time, j is large enough that a1 j ≫ a0, similar for b( j), c( j) and d( j). When a1 = b1 = c1 = d1 = 0, we obtain the
one-third law as a special case.
The above is verified with direct calculation of ρA.
ρA = 1/(1 +
N−1∑
k=1
k∏
j=1
gi
fi ) (10)
2
(Nowak et al., 2004), where fi and gi are fitness of strategies A and B, respectively:
fi = 1 − w + w[a( j)( j − 1) + b( j)(N − j)]/(N − 1) (11)
and
gi = 1 − w + w[c( j) j + d( j)(N − j − 1)]/(N − 1), (12)
with w (w ≪ 1) being the intensity of selection. Under weak selection, calculations yield
ρA =
1
N
+
β
12N
[(A2 − B2)N2 + (A1 − B1)N + (A0 − B0)] (13)
Thus for large N, the condition for ρA > 1/N is (7) or (8) or(9).
The payoff matrix of both the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game can be denoted with two parameters ,
the benefit b and the cost c (b > c) (Fu et al., 2010). As an example, we study the case where b is a monotonically
increasing linear function of the number of cooperators j in a group of fixed size N, i.e., b( j) = p + q j (p > 1 and
q > 0). For simplicity, we set c = 1. This arrangement can be understood that in a society where more individuals
cooperate, cooperation produces greater benefit, yet there is also a stronger temptation to defect.
The prisoner’s dilemma has the payoff matrix
C D
C
D
(
b( j) − 1
b( j)
−1
0
)
. (14)
Thus, A2 = a1 + b1 = q = c1 + d1 = B2, and we need to compare A1 and B1. Here A1 = 2a0 − a1 + 4b0 + b1 =
2(p− 1)− q+ 4(−1)+ 0 = 2p− q− 6, and B1 = 2c0 + c1 + 4d0 − d1 = 2p+ q+ 4× 0− 0 = 2p+ q. Therefore A1 < B1,
which suggests cooperation is disadvantageous (i.e., the fixation probability of a single cooperator ρC is smaller than
1/N).
In contrast, the snowdrift game has the payoff matrix
C D
C
D
(
b( j) − 1/2
b( j)
b( j) − 1
0
) (15)
Thus, A2 = a1 + b1 = 2q, and B2 = c1 + d1 = q. Therefore A2 > B2, suggesting that cooperation is advantageous (i.e.,
ρC > 1/N).
When b is a constant, the one-third law yields b − 3 > b for the prisoner’s dilemma, which is impossible, and
3b − 3/2 > b for the snowdrift game, which is, however, satisfied for all b (note that we already require b > 1).
Therefore, cooperation is advantageous in the snowdrift game but not in the prisoner’s dilemma, which is still the
case, as we have shown, when b is a monotonically increasing linear function of j.
While this may not be very interesting so far, we further consider the cases in between. There are situations not
so bad as the prisoner’s dilemma and at the same time not as good as the snowdrift game. We introduce a parameter x
(0 < x < 1), which is the closeness of the payoff matrix to that of the prisoner’s dilemma, to represent those. And we
use a linear combination of the payoff matrices of the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game to form our payoff
matrix:
C D
C
D
(
x[b( j) − 1] + (1 − x)[b( j) − 1/2]
xb( j) + (1 − x)b( j)
−x + (1 − x)[b( j) − 1]
0
)
. (16)
x and 1 − x may also be understood as the probabilities that the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game are
being played, respectively, and our game is a combination of the two. A2 > B2 ( i.e.,a1 + b1 > c1 + d1) yields
qx + 2q(1 − x) > qx + q(1 − x), i.e., q(1 − x) > 0, which is satisfied automatically. However, if b is constant, the
one-third law (1) requires (b−3)x+ (3b−3/2)(1− x) > bx+b(1− x), i.e., b ≥ −3/4+3/2(1− x). This is satisfied only
when b is big enough. In particular, when x approximates 1, this will require b to approximate infinity. Therefore, we
arrive at an interesting conclusion: this increase of b with j is helpful in establishing the dominance of cooperation
in cases between the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game (or cases that are combinations of the two). When
b is a monotonically increasing function of j, a minimum portion of the snowdrift game is needed to transform the
prisoner’s dilemma into a game where cooperation is advantageous.
3
3. Conclusion
We derived the condition for strategy A to be advantageous in finite population games, when selection is weak,
population size is large, and the payoff matrix varies with the number of A-players. When the payoff matrix is
constant, the condition becomes the one-third law given by Nowak et al. (2004).
The condition was then applied to the study of the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift game, and their combinations,
whose payoff matrices can all be denoted with two parameters, the benefit b and the cost c (Fu et al., 2010). While
an increase of b with the number of cooperators has little significance in reshaping the prisoner’s dilemma, where
cooperation is disadvantageous, or the snowdrift game, where cooperation is advantageous, it plays a rather important
role in cases that are combinations of the two.
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